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We use non-experimental data from a large panel of schools and districts in 
Indiana to evaluate the impacts of math curricula on student achievement. 
Using matching methods, we obtain causal estimates of curriculum effects at 
just a fraction of what it would cost to produce experimental estimates. 
Furthermore, external validity concerns that are particularly cogent in 
experimental curricular evaluations suggest that our non-experimental 
estimates may be preferred. In the short term, we find large differences in 
effectiveness across some math curricula. However, as with many other 
educational inputs, the effects of math curricula do not persist over time. 
Across curriculum adoption cycles, publishers that produce less effective 
curricula in one cycle do not lose market share in the next cycle. One 
explanation for this result is the dearth of information available to 
administrators about curricular effectiveness. 
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I. Introduction 
Curricular effectiveness has received much attention in the education literature, and 
justifiably so (see, for example, Slavin and Lake, 2008; National Research Board, 2004). The 
majority of instructional time and homework assignments are textbook oriented, and a 
substantial amount of school expenditures are devoted to curriculum purchases. According to a 
2002 survey sponsored by the National Education Association and the American Association of 
Publishers, 80% of teachers use textbooks in the classroom, and over half of students’ in-class 
instructional time involves textbook use (Finn, 2004).1 In 2006 alone, expenditures on K-12 
instructional materials totaled close to $8.1 billion dollars.2 Different curricula are developed 
using different theories about how students learn - this results in different content, organization 
and structure across curricula for the same subject and grade group. Given the central role that 
curricula play for students and schools, it is of interest to determine the extent to which different 
curricula differentially affect student achievement. 
Hundreds of studies have attempted to evaluate the curricular alternatives facing school 
administrators. However, much of the literature on curricular effectiveness lacks scientific rigor, 
raising concerns about the reliability of the findings. For example, in 2007, the What Works 
Clearinghouse (WWC), which was established by the Institute for Education Sciences (IES) to 
serve as a filter for education research, evaluated over 200 studies of curricular effectiveness in 
elementary mathematics and found that over 96 percent of these studies did not meet reasonable 
quality standards (WWC, 2007).3 Likely in response to the dearth of reliable evidence in the 
                                                 
1 Textbooks are just one component of the curricula purchased by schools from publishers. Other aspects include 
teacher instructional support services and supplementary materials such as student workbooks, flashcards, and 
solution manuals.  
2 See http://www.aapschool.org/vp_funding.html 
3 The WWC reviews the literature on a variety of topics in education, including the effects of curriculum adoptions, 
and classifies studies as either (1) meets evidence standards, (2) meets evidence standards with reservations or (3) 
does not meet evidence standards. Generally speaking, studies in category (1) use randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs) or quasi-experiments (e.g., regression discontinuity designs). Studies in category (2) may employ non-
experimental techniques, but must be deemed by the principal investigator at WWC to have employed appropriate 
statistical tools such that causal inference is reasonable. Of the 237 studies on elementary math curricula reviewed 
by the WWC as of July, 2007, just nine were deemed to be of sufficient quality by WWC to be included in 
categories (1) and (2) (WWC, 2007). 
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literature, recent research has turned to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate 
curricular effectiveness (see, for example, Agodini et al., 2009; Borman et al., 2008; Resendez 
and Azin, 2007). RCTs randomly assign curricula across schools (and/or classrooms) and 
produce causal estimates of curriculum effects that are internally valid – that is, valid within the 
framework of the experiment. However, a general drawback of RCTs that is particularly cogent 
in the case of curricular evaluation is that the estimates may not extrapolate well outside of the 
experiment.  
We highlight two concerns with RCTs in the context of curricular evaluation that will 
potentially limit the external validity of their results.4 First, RCTs require voluntary participation 
by both schools and curriculum publishers. If the schools that select into the experiment differ 
from the general population of schools, then Manski’s (1996) “experimentation on a 
subpopulation” concern is relevant, and the experimental results will not necessarily reveal 
anything about curricular effectiveness at schools not represented in the study.5 Perhaps more 
importantly, there is also a selection problem with respect to publishers because publishers are 
typically actively involved in the experiments. For example, in recent experimental studies by 
Agodini et al. (2009), Borman et al. (2008) and Resendez and Azin (2007), publishers directly 
provided teacher training and support services.6 The active role of publishers in experimental 
studies means that publishers must agree to participate, and only publishers that expect their 
curricula to be successful in the setting of the RCT are likely to do so. Overall, the requirements 
of voluntary school and publisher participation limit the extent to which experimental designs 
can be used to evaluate the full curricular landscape. 
                                                 
4 See Heckman and Smith (1995) and Manski (1996) for general discussions about the strengths and weaknesses of 
experimental research designs. 
5 A common concern in educational experiments is that participating schools may differ in leadership from the 
average non-participating school. For instance, in Agodini et al’s. (2009) study, the authors state “Participating sites 
are not a representative sample of districts and schools, because interested sites are likely to be unique in ways that 
make it difficult to select a representative sample. Interested districts were willing to use all four of the study’s 
curricula, allowed the curricula to be randomly assigned to their participating schools, and were willing to have the 
study team test students and collect other data required by the evaluation.” 
6 In fact, we are not aware of any experimental curriculum evaluations where the publishers were not actively 
involved.  
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A second threat to the external validity of RCTs is publisher responsiveness to 
evaluation, commonly referred to as Hawthorne effects. In the general experimental literature, 
Hawthorne effects refer to the subjects of the experiment. In the case of curricular evaluation, the 
active role of publishers suggests that in addition to schools and students, they are subjects. 
Given that the experimental evaluations are high-stakes competitions for publishers, there is no 
reason to expect them to take a “business-as-usual” approach. The potential for publisher 
Hawthorne effects in RCTs raises concerns about how well their results will extrapolate to 
lower-stakes environments for publishers.7  
In addition to these threats to external validity, the costs associated with RCTs limit the 
amount of information that they can provide. For example, because RCTs are expensive, they 
generally focus on just one or two curricula evaluated at small numbers of schools and districts.8 
The expenses associated with RCTs also limit their usefulness in evaluating long-term impacts 
because it is costly to maintain the validity of the experiment over time.  
Experimental evaluations are informative and offer a number of benefits; however, these 
issues, some of which are specific to curricular evaluation, suggest that a careful and rigorous 
non-experimental analysis can make a useful contribution to the literature. This is precisely what 
we provide in our study, using non-experimental data from the entire state of Indiana to estimate 
math curriculum effects on student achievement. We evaluate the three most-used curricula in 
the state from 1998 - 2004, which together, accounted for 86 percent of all curriculum adoptions 
in the grades that we study. Indiana provides the most detailed information about curriculum 
adoptions over time of any of the 50 states, and also provides thorough school- and district-level 
                                                 
7 In the Agodini et al. (2009) study, the study team “provided logistical and financial support for any level of 
training the publishers indicated was appropriate.” Although publishers typically provide training and support 
services whenever a new curriculum is adopted, they have added incentive to provide high-quality training and 
support during a RCT.  
8 In what is a relatively large-scale RCT, Agodini et al. (2009) evaluate four different curricula (more than the usual 
one or two curricula in other studies), but still only evaluate four school districts and 39 schools in the first wave of 
their study (in the second wave they will scale up to just over 100 schools). Their study was funded by the Institue 
for Education Sciences for over 21 million dollars. More typical RCTs are even more narrowly focused. Borman et 
al. (2008) and Resendez and Azin (2007) each evaluate just a single curriculum, looking across only five and four 
schools, respectively. 
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data about student achievement, demographics and school finances dating back many years.  
With the exception of the information about curriculum adoptions, similar data are available in 
many other states, suggesting that it would be straightforward to replicate our analysis 
elsewhere.9   
We use school-level matching estimators in our study, adopting the pairwise-comparison 
approach suggested by Lechner (2002) to evaluate the three curricula. Drawing on the extensive 
methodological literature on matching, we show that the data conditions in Indiana are generally 
favorable to such an approach, particularly in our comparison of the two most popular curricula 
in the state. A key feature of our study is that we have constructed an extended data panel of 
Indiana schools containing information from multiple cohorts of students who were never 
exposed to the curricula that we evaluate. We use data from these cohorts to perform a series of 
falsification tests for our estimates, which show that our primary findings are unlikely to be 
driven by selection into the different curricula. 
We highlight three primary results from our study: (1) differences across some math 
curricula have large short-term effects on student achievement, (2) as has been found with other 
educational inputs (see, e.g., Jacob et al., 2008; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2010), math-curriculum effects do not persist over time, and (3) curriculum publishers that are 
relatively less effective in one adoption cycle do not lose market share in future adoption cycles. 
This latter result shares a common theme with prior research suggesting that educational 
administrators do not make optimal choices (Ballou, 1996). In this case, one explanation is the 
limited availability of reliable evidence on curricular effectiveness. 
II. The Curriculum Selection Process 
Curricula are adopted in Indiana for a single subject in each year across the entire state, 
and rotate in six-year cycles by subject. For example, Indiana’s districts adopted new math 
curricula in 1998 and 2004, with an upcoming adoption in 2010. Similarly, recent reading 
                                                 
9 It would not be expensive for states to track curriculum adoptions, particularly when compared to the costs of 
tracking some of the other information that is commonly collected. 
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adoptions occurred in 1994, 2000 and 2006. We focus our attention primarily on the math 
curriculum adoption that occurred in 1998. 
The curriculum selection process in Indiana has centralized and decentralized 
components. The process begins with the state of Indiana’s Department of Education (DOE) 
approving a list of selected curricula for use in the state. Upon receiving this list from the DOE, 
districts have three choices. First, and most commonly, they can adopt one or more of the state-
approved curricula. Second, districts may choose to apply for alternate curricula that are not on 
the state-approved list, but this option is almost never used (e.g., no more than one out of the 
roughly 300 districts chooses this option in any grade in our data). Third, districts can apply for 
“continued use” where they continue to use the curricula that were adopted in the prior adoption 
cycle in that subject. The “continued use” option is not the same as a district choosing to adopt a 
new edition from the same publisher. Quite literally, it continues to use the old textbooks from 
the prior adoption cycle. Overall, over 98 percent of the districts in Indiana adopted new math 
curricula from the approved list during the 1998 adoption cycle in each grade. 
We treat the DOE’s approval process as exogenous to the districts, and focus our analysis 
on identifying differential curriculum effects among the curricula that are included on the DOE’s 
approved list. The centralized approval process adds a constraint to the environment whereby we 
cannot evaluate curricula that are not approved by the state. However, it is not clear that the 
DOE’s constraint is binding for districts in any meaningful way. For example, although districts 
can apply to use curricula outside the state-approved list, this rarely happens in practice, 
suggesting that most districts are content to choose among the available options. Perhaps more 
telling, the majority of the curriculum market share belongs to just a handful of publishers. 
Specifically, 86 percent of all curriculum adoptions in the grades that we study involve just three 
of the ten state-approved curricula during the adoption cycle of interest.10  
                                                 
10 Indiana is one of 22 states that have a state-level component to the adoption process. Tulley (1989) finds that in 
states where there is not a centralized component to the adoption process, the curriculum review processes and 
lengths of use are similar despite the lack of a formal process dictating textbook choice. In conjunction with the 
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III. Data 
We constructed a 17-year data panel of schools and districts in Indiana to evaluate the 
effects of math curriculum adoptions in grades one, two and three on grade-3 test scores in math 
(grade-3 is the first time that students are tested in Indiana). Among the 50 states, Indiana is the 
only state where curriculum-adoption information is available at the district level for multiple 
statewide adoption cycles.11 Upon request, Indiana provides detailed school- and district-level 
information on test scores (from the Indiana state test, the ISTEP), attendance rates and 
enrollment demographics (including language minorities and students on free and reduced price 
lunch). Indiana also collects district-level financial information. Details on the district- and 
school-level information used in our analysis are provided in Table 1.  
We evaluate the three curricula that dominated the market during the adoption cycle of 
interest (1998-2004). These curricula were published by Saxon, Silver-Burdett Ginn and Scott-
Foresman, and they accounted for roughly 48, 23 and 15 percent of observed curriculum 
adoptions in the state, respectively. We denote the Saxon curriculum as curriculum A, the Silver-
Burdett Ginn curriculum as curriculum B, and the Scott-Foresman curriculum as curriculum C.  
Because we first observe student outcomes in grade 3, our estimates of curriculum effects 
characterize the impacts of sequences of treatments. That is, grade-3 test scores are presumably a 
function of the curricula to which students are exposed in grades one, two and three. To allow for 
cleanly identified curriculum effects, we exclude districts that adopted different curricula in 
different grades from our analysis. To illustrate the assignment problem for these districts, 
consider a district that adopted curriculum A in grade one and curriculum B in grades two and 
three. In identifying the effect of curriculum A relative to curriculum B, the schools in this 
district are not well-defined as either treatments or controls.12  
                                                                                                                                                             
limited practical importance of the centralized constraint, this suggests that the centralized component to Indiana’s 
curriculum adoptions should not affect the generalizability of the results. 
11 In fact, in many states, the DOE does not even have a centralized database indicating which curricula are being 
used by districts within the state during the current adoption cycle, let alone historical information. 
12 Although we want to distinguish our estimates from estimates of single-year curriculum effects, our analysis is not 
related to the literature on sequences of treatments that also involve sequential decisions (see, for example, Lechner, 
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We also exclude districts where more than one curriculum was adopted because the data 
do not indicate which curricula were used by which schools within each district. Only in cases 
where a district adopted a single curriculum at all schools can we be sure that our treatment and 
comparison schools are properly identified.  
We refer to districts that used the same curriculum at all schools and in all three grades as 
“uniform curriculum adopters.” Restricting our analysis to these districts reduces our district 
sample size by eight percent and the analogous school sample size by seven percent (complete 
details on how we arrived at our final data sample are provided in Appendix Table A.1). That is, 
most districts are “uniform adopters.” Overall, our analysis includes data from 213 districts and 
716 schools. Contrasted with the experimental literature, where studies often focus on just a 
handful of schools and districts, our non-experimental design allows for a much broader 
evaluation of curricular effectiveness.  
In Table 1 we report differences in means across the schools and districts that adopted the 
different curricula, using pre-adoption information from 1997. There are only small differences 
in test score performance and attendance outcomes across adopters of the different curricula, 
suggesting that selection into the curricula may be limited. However, there are noticeable 
differences in terms of school demographics, district size, and to some extent, median household 
income (measured at the district level from the US Census). Among other things, Table 1 
indicates that Saxon adopters are disproportionately rural districts, as evidenced by their much 
smaller district sizes (and corresponding revenues) and their larger shares of white students.  
IV. Curriculum Descriptions 
In 1998, Mathematically Correct (MC), a national organization of mathematicians, 
scientists and engineers, qualitatively evaluated eight grade-2 math curricula, including the three 
curricula that we evaluate here. The MC evaluations were sponsored by the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation, a non-profit, non-partisan research institute. We briefly highlight the key differences 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004; Lechner and Miquel, 2009). In our study, districts make a treatment decision at a single point in time. Thus, 
methodologically, our evaluation procedure is the same as in the typical one-shot treatment case. 
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between the Saxon, Silver-Burdett Ginn and Scott-Foresman curricula as indicated by MC. We 
also report the MC rating for each curriculum, which was based on a 5-point scale (all three 
curricula received a similar rating from MC). 
 
Curriculum A: Saxon Math (overall rating: 3.6) 
The MC evaluation indicates that the program design is “easily implemented by 
teachers,” and instructions to teachers are “clear and direct.” In fact, the teacher’s manual even 
includes scripted statements and questions for the teacher to ask to the class. The worksheets that 
students use are not necessarily related to the daily lesson, and contain a mixture of topics from 
prior lessons. One side of the worksheet is completed in class and checked, and the other side is 
assigned for homework. Oral assessments are given to individual students every 10 lessons, and 
are conducted while other students work on written work. Written assessments occur after every 
five lessons.  
Saxon Math is very thorough in the topics that are covered, but more advanced topics are 
generally not covered. That is, this program supports learning effectively to a certain level but 
beyond that, achievement will be “very limited.” As one example, of the three curricula of 
interest here, Saxon math is the only curriculum that does not cover addition and subtraction with 
three-digit numbers in the second grade. Overall, the MC evaluation suggests that Saxon Math 
may be the most effective curriculum for low-achieving students given its thorough coverage of 
the topics it covers, but will be less effective for high-achieving students.  
 
Curriculum B: Silver-Burdett Ginn Math (overall rating: 3.4) 
 The teacher’s manual provides guidance to teachers, although the guidance is not as 
direct as in Saxon Math. The teacher is given some discretion over how to present the material. 
In the example from the MC review, the teacher has two presentation choices for the lesson that 
are described as “visual/spatial learning” and one presentation choice that is described as 
“kinesthetic learning.” In some cases, there is also a technology-based alternative. Student 
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worksheets are tied to the daily lesson. No information is given about the regularity of 
assessments or homework assignments.  
The MC review highlights that this curriculum relies heavily on graphics to aid in the 
calculations (i.e., uses a “models” approach). In teaching addition and subtraction, for example, 
the curriculum relies heavily on graphics at first, but phases out their use later on. MC identifies 
the reliance of this curriculum on graphics as a weakness; however, notably, MC still rated 
curriculum B similarly to the other curricula in our study.  
The level of this curriculum appears to be higher than that of Saxon Math – MC reports 
that students using this program have a “reasonable chance of moderate achievement levels” but 
also that the program is “not seen as supporting high achievement levels.”  
 
Curriculum C: Scott-Foresman Addison Wesley Math (overall rating: 3.8) 
The teacher’s edition received mixed reviews from the MC evaluation. Like the Silver-
Burdett Ginn curriculum, the lessons also involve some discretion for teachers in terms of the 
activities that they use to teach each lesson (although there appear to be fewer teacher choices). 
Vocabulary development is an important part of this curriculum – new vocabulary words are 
introduced at the beginning of each lesson, and a verbal skills assessment occurs after each 
lesson. A one page homework sheet is also attached to each lesson.  
The level of this program appears to be somewhere in between the levels in the prior two 
curricula. On the one hand, the MC review indicates that “the level is low in a few topics” and 
“at the top level of students…some topics should be augmented.” On the other hand, the review 
also notes that “some areas are very well taught and at an excellent level.”  
 
It is important to note that while the MC reviews provide useful insights, they are not 
based on analyses of actual implementation, let alone student outcomes. We present the 
descriptions simply to highlight some of the differences that exist in organization, content, and 
presentation across these three math curricula. 
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V. Methodology 
We use school-level matching estimators to identify curriculum effects. Matching is an 
increasingly common technique employed in empirical work, and the conditions under which 
matching will identify causal estimates of treatment effects have been well-documented (see, for 
example, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997). The key benefits of matching 
relative to simple regression analysis are (1) matching imposes weaker functional form 
restrictions and (2) matching resolves any “extrapolation” problems that may arise in regression 
analysis by limiting the influence of non-comparable treatment and control units in the data 
(Black and Smith, 2004).  
Briefly, the key assumption under which matching will return causal estimates of 
treatment effects is the conditional independence assumption (CIA). The CIA requires that 
potential outcomes are independent of the curriculum uptake decision conditional on observable 
information. Denoting potential outcomes by {Y0, Y1,..,YK}, curriculum treatment options by T є 
{0,1….K}, and X as a vector of observable school- and district-level information, the CIA in our 
multi-treatment context can be written as:13 
XTYYY K |,...,, 10 ⊥                               (1) 
Conditional independence will not be satisfied if there is unobserved information that influences 
both treatment and outcomes. For example, if districts have access to information that is 
unobserved to the econometrician, Z, such that P( | , ) P( | ),T k X Z T k X= ≠ =  and the additional 
information in Z also influences outcomes, matching will produce biased estimates of curriculum 
effects.  
  We estimate average treatment effects (ATEs) for the three curricula using a basic 
pairwise-comparison approach, as suggested by Lechner (2002), and match schools using an 
estimated propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In a comparison between curriculum j 
                                                 
13 The CIA is actually a stronger assumption than is required to identify causal treatment effects, although it is 
difficult to imagine an environment where only the weaker but necessary condition of conditional mean 
independence is satisfied (Heckman et al., 1997; Imbens, 2004). 
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and curriculum m, and defining Pj as the probability of choosing j, we match schools by 
( )j
j m
P
P P+ , where Pj and Pm are estimated using a multinomial probit that simultaneously models 
the three treatment options (Lechner, 2002).  
 We use kernel and local-linear-regression (LLR) matching estimators. These estimators 
construct the match for each “treated” school using a weighted average over multiple “control” 
schools, and vice versa. For a given curricular comparison, defining j as the treatment and m as 
the control, we estimate ATEj,m using the following formula: 
 ∑ ∑∑ ∑
∩∈ ∩∈∩∈ ∩∈
−−−=
pm pmpj pj SNm SIj
jm
SNj SIm
mjSmj YjmWYYmjWYN
00
}]),({}),({[1ˆ ,θ   (2) 
In (2), SN is the number of schools using j or m on the common support, Sp. I0j indicates 
the set of schools that chose m in the neighborhood of observation j, and I0m indicates the set of 
schools that chose j in the neighborhood of observation m (where neighborhoods are defined 
based on propensity scores using a bandwidth parameter – see Appendix B). Yj and Ym are 
outcomes for treated and control schools, respectively, and W(j,m) and W(m,j) weight each 
comparison school outcome depending on its distance, in terms of estimated propensity scores, 
from the observation of interest. We omit a more detailed discussion of kernel and LLR 
matching estimators for brevity. For more information, see Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), and Fan 
(1993).14 
 Our matching estimators are conditioned on all of the observable information detailed in 
Table 1. Ex ante, it is unclear how unobserved selection into the different curricula might bias 
our estimates. For example, we might be worried that the adopters of the different curricula have 
student populations that differ in unobservable ways, or that differences in administrator quality 
                                                 
14 Our results are robust to alternative matching estimators, and weighting estimators based on propensity scores (for 
discussions of weighting estimators see Imbens 2004; Millimet and Tchernis, 2009). See Section VIII for more 
detail. 
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that are correlated with curriculum adoptions may bias our results.15 More generally, a limitation 
of matching analyses is that the CIA is not a testable assumption. However, we can get some 
indication as to the plausibility of conditional independence in our case by estimating curriculum 
“effects” for cohorts of students who were never actually exposed to the curricula of interest. If 
our matching procedure is producing estimates that are not biased by unobserved selection, we 
should estimate effects of zero for these cohorts. In Section IX, we present 80 different 
falsification estimates along these lines. These tests show that our primary findings are unlikely 
to be driven by selection on unobservables. 
Finally, average treatment-on-the-treated effects (ATTs) may also be of interest. ATT’s 
can provide important information if the curricula differentially affect different subgroups of 
schools. For example, consider a case where ,j mθ = 0. This could occur even if schools that chose 
j were better off for having chosen j, and schools that chose m were also better off for having 
chosen m. In addition to our ATE estimates, we also estimate ATT’s for all of the curricular 
comparisons and in both directions (that is, for each comparison we estimate both ATTj,m and 
ATTm,j). We briefly discuss our findings in Section VIII, but in general, we gain little additional 
insight by estimating the ATTs. 
VI. Timing and Treatment Definition 
Timing is an important issue in our analysis. Our data panel spans 17 years, starting with 
the 1991-1992 school year and ending with the 2007-2008 school year. The curricula of interest 
were adopted in the fall of 1998, and replaced with new curricula in the fall of 2004. We observe 
seven cohorts of grade-3 students who were never exposed to the curricula of interest during the 
pre-period (1991-1992 through 1997-1998), one cohort that was exposed to the curricula in grade 
three only (1998-1999), one cohort that was exposed in grades two and three only (1999-2000), 
four cohorts that used the curricula in grades one, two and three and were thus “fully exposed” 
(2000-2001 through 2003-2004), one cohort that was exposed in grades one and two only (2004-
                                                 
15Another concern would be that students may move across districts in response to curriculum adoptions. In results 
omitted for brevity, we find no evidence of such movement.  
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2005), one cohort that was exposed in grade one only (2005-2006), and two additional cohorts 
that were never exposed to the curricula in the post-period (2006-2007 and 2007-2008).  
Recall that the estimated curriculum effects are based on grade-3 test scores, and as such 
represent the effects of sequences of treatments ( 1 2 3, ,g g gT T T ). For the fully-exposed cohorts, the 
sequences for treatment and control schools are fully observed, meaning that these cohorts 
provide our cleanest estimates of curricular effectiveness. For the partially-exposed cohorts (the 
cohorts that were exposed to the curricula for at least one year, but less than three years), we can 
still estimate treatment effects because part of the curriculum sequence is observed. However, 
our analysis for these cohorts is limited because we do not observe curriculum treatments outside 
of the adoption cycle. A similar concern regarding out-of-cycle curriculum adoptions is relevant 
for our falsification tests (using the cohorts prior to 1998-1999, and after 2005-2006). This issue 
will be addressed in more detail in Sections VIII and IX when we present our results. 
An additional concern related to timing is that the exposure levels of the different cohorts 
overlap with “curriculum familiarity” at schools. For example, the 1999-2000 cohort was 
exposed to the curricula for just one year, in grade 3, which was the year in which the curricula 
were first introduced at districts, and perhaps more importantly, to teachers. The 2005-2006 
cohort was also exposed to the curricula for just one year, in grade 1, but at that point the 
curricula had been in use for many years. If teacher familiarity with curricula affects 
achievement, and curricula differentially affect outcomes depending on the grade level at which 
students are exposed, our estimates of curricular effectiveness at different grade-levels of 
exposure will be intertwined with the effects of different levels of curriculum familiarity. We can 
separately identify familiarity effects only across the four fully exposed cohorts - these cohorts 
were exposed for all three grades but differ with respect to their instructors’ familiarity with the 
curricula.  
Finally, a third timing issue involves district restructuring over the course of the 17 years 
of our data panel. Specifically, there is a pattern of school consolidations in the data such that the 
number of individual elementary schools decreases over time. As will be discussed in the 
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following section, we match schools based on their static characteristics from the 1996-1997 and 
1997-1998 school years. School consolidations may alter the populations of students served by 
the schools that remain in operation over time. This will reduce the quality of our matches, and 
potentially introduce bias into our estimates. 
In order for the school consolidations to bias our estimates they must be correlated with 
curriculum adoptions. However, this does not appear to be the case. Using a 2χ  test for 
independence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that curriculum adoptions are independent of 
whether a district experiences a school closing (p-value ≈ 0.40). Additional evidence that our 
results are unlikely to be biased by school consolidations is provided in the next section where 
we evaluate the balance of the covariates across matched treatment and control schools over the 
entire course of the data panel. If the schools that drop out of our sample over time 
systematically adopted specific curricula, we should find that our treatment and control samples 
become less balanced as we move away from the matching years (1996-97 and 1997-98). We 
find little evidence of this, which further supports our contention that school closings are not 
correlated with curriculum adoptions (see Table 2).16 
Although we do not expect the school consolidations to bias our results, they will reduce 
the quality of our matches as we move away from the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school years in 
the data panel. This will add noise to our estimates. Ultimately, we simply report this issue as a 
caveat, and caution the reader to interpret results that are estimated far away from the matching 
years more liberally. In an omitted analysis, we also considered a more direct solution to this 
problem – at any point where a school closing was observed in a district, we dropped all school-
level observations from that district for the remainder of the data panel.17 This alternative 
                                                 
16 Of course, this use of balancing to test for non-random attrition will only catch non-random attrition if it is 
correlated with observables. Nonetheless, in conjunction with the our general test for independence between school 
closings and curriculum adoptions, the time-invariant balancing in our data further supports the contention that the 
school closings will not bias our estimates.  
17 We also performed an analogous procedure for schools that existed in 1996-1997, but came into existence 
between 1991-1992 and 1996-1997. If school closings re-shuffle student populations within districts, such an 
approach will reduce the number of bad matches in the data. There is enough natural variation in the enrollment data 
that we cannot always identify which specific schools are affected by a school closing, particularly when the closing 
15 
 
approach produces estimates that are qualitatively similar to what we report below, although the 
efficiency costs associated with discarding data from entire districts may be higher than those 
from allowing the less accurate matches to occur.18 
VII. The Propensity Score 
We use a multinomial probit (MNP) specification to estimate the pairwise propensity 
scores that we use to match schools. The covariates that we include in the MNP are documented 
in Table 1, and contain both school and district level information. At the school level, the 
propensity-score model includes controls for enrollment, demographics (race, free and reduced-
price lunch status, language status) and outcomes (i.e., grade-3 test scores in math and language 
arts, and attendance) from the 1996-1997 school year, and controls for enrollment and 
demographics from the 1997-1998 school year (for brevity, means are not reported in the table 
for the 1998 information). At the district level, the model includes enrollment, outcome and 
finance controls from 1996-1997, and enrollment and finance controls from 1997-1998. We also 
use district-level zip codes to assign Census measures of local-area socioeconomic status to each 
school. Namely, we include controls for median household income and the share of the adult 
population who do not have a high-school diploma, both obtained from the year-2000 census. 
We treat these census variables as fixed area characteristics.  
The covariates in the MNP specification were selected based on the process by which the 
curricula were adopted, with the objective of replicating the relevant information set available to 
schools and districts at the time of the adoption decision. The curriculum-adoption process in 
Indiana lasts approximately 18 months, and for the 1998 adoption this process culminated with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
school is small. Therefore, the most straightforward solution is to drop all schools in the district where the school 
closing is observed. 
18 An additional problem with this alternative strategy is that when a school closes we cannot be certain that the only 
other schools that are affected are in the same district. For example, if the closing school is on the border of another 
district, its students may change districts, in which case the district-dropping procedure would be doubly harmful – it 
would retain the schools in the new district where the students from the closed school were infused, and drop the 
schools from the district where the school closed even though these schools were not affected by the closing.  
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final decision in the summer of 1998.19  Spring 1998 test scores would not have been available to 
decision makers prior to the adoption decision, and therefore, we do not include test scores from 
the 1997-1998 school-year in the MNP (we also omit annual attendance figures from 1997-1998 
for the same reason). However, our findings are not qualitatively sensitive to reasonable 
adjustments to the MNP specification, including the addition of the 1997-1998 outcome 
variables. Similarly, our findings do not depend on whether we include additional years of 
lagged test scores in the propensity-score specification. An important reason for limiting the 
number of lagged years of achievement in the propensity-score specification is that we want to 
use as many years of data as possible for the falsification tests. Each year of data that we use to 
match schools is one less year that we can use in the falsification exercise.  
In each comparison we match treatment and control schools based on the estimated 
pairwise propensity scores, and test for balance in the covariates among the treated and control 
samples used for estimation.20 Balancing tests are motivated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
The tests determine whether | ( | )X T P T k X⊥ = , a necessary condition if the propensity score is 
to be used to reduce the dimensionality of the matching problem to one.  
Although achieving covariate balance is important for any matching analysis that relies 
on a propensity score, there is no clearly preferred test for balance. Furthermore, in some cases, 
different balancing tests return different results (Smith and Todd, 2005). Given this limitation, 
we consider two different tests. The first is a regression-based test suggested by Smith and Todd 
(2005), estimated separately for each covariate in each year of our analysis: 
                          
2 3 4
0 1 2 3 4
2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ* * ( ) * * ( ) * * ( ) * * ( )
kX P X P X P X P X
T T P X T P X T P X T P X
β β β β β
β β β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + + +  (3) 
                                                 
19 The timeline for the current math-curriculum adoption cycle is available at 
http://www.doe.in.gov/olr/docs/CHRONOLOGYFORTHE2009MATHEMATICSADOPTIONApr09.pdf. 
20 For brevity we do not report the results from the propensity-score model, but they are available upon request. To 
provide a sense of the predictive power of the covariates in the model, we estimate separate linear-regression models 
for each curriculum comparison where the dependent variable indicates the adoption of one of the curricula, and the 
independent variables are the covariates from the MNP. Within comparison pairs, the covariates explain 23 to 42 
percent of the variability in curriculum adoptions. 
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In (3), Xk represents a covariate from the propensity-score specification, ˆ( )P X  is the estimated 
pairwise propensity score, and T indicates treatment. We test whether the coefficients 5 9β β−   
are jointly equal to zero in each regression – that is, we test whether treatment predicts the X’s 
conditional on a quartic of the propensity score. 
 The second test measures the absolute standardized bias in observables after matching, 
and was originally suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The formula for the absolute 
standardized bias for covariate Xk is given by: 
0 0
1| [ { ( , ) } { ( , ) }] |
( ) *100
( ) ( )
2
j p j p m p m p
kj km km kjS
j N S m I S m N S j I S
k
kj km
X W j m X X W m j X
N
SDIFF X
Var X Var X
∈ ∩ ∈ ∩ ∈ ∩ ∈ ∩
− − −
= +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
        (4) 
The numerator in (4) is analogous to the formula for our matching estimators in (2) where we 
replace Y with Xk and take the absolute value. Note that the variances in the denominator are 
calculated using the full sample (i.e., they include observations that are not on the common 
support). A weakness of the standardized-bias approach is that there is not a clear rule by which 
to judge the results, although Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a value of 20 is large. 
Our MNP specification uses 32 school- and district-level covariates. The results from the 
balancing tests are reported in Table 2 by comparison and year. From the regression tests we 
report the number of covariates where the F-tests reject the null hypothesis at the 5- and 10-
percent levels (the former group is a subset of the latter), and the average p-values across all F-
tests. We also report the average absolute standardized bias across all covariates. The median 
absolute standardized bias is also often reported – we omit it for brevity but note it is always 
smaller than the average.  
Table 2 indicates that our comparison between B and A achieves better balance than our 
other comparisons. For this comparison, both the regression tests and the standardized-bias 
results suggest that schools are well-matched. For our comparisons between C and A, and C and 
B, the covariates appear to be less balanced, although it is not clear that the levels of imbalance 
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in these comparisons are cause for concern. For example, the average p-values from the F-tests 
in both comparisons are fairly close to 0.50 in all years, which suggests good balance, despite 
there being more unbalanced covariates than would be expected by chance in both cases. 
Similarly, although the average absolute standardized bias is much larger in these comparisons 
than in our comparison between B and A, by some standards it is still quite reasonable. 
Although it is not obvious that the level of imbalance in any of our comparisons is large 
enough to be problematic, in unreported results we considered many alternative propensity score 
specifications where we added various combinations of higher-order and interaction terms to the 
MNP in an effort to improve covariate balance.  Likely due in part to our relatively small 
treatment and control samples (compared to the general matching literature), these alternative 
models generated only modest improvements in covariate balance, and did not affect our 
findings qualitatively. Therefore, we proceed below using the simple MNP to predict curriculum 
adoptions for each comparison, noting that the balancing results are less compelling in our 
comparisons between C and A, and C and B.   
We also calculate the divergence between the densities of the estimated propensity scores 
for treated and control units in each comparison. Intuitively, density divergence will affect the 
precision of the estimates obtained from matching. Density divergence has been discussed in 
numerous studies, including Frölich (2004), who measures divergence using the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) information criterion. We follow his approach here, using kernel-density plots 
based on the Epanechnikov kernel. For example, denoting 21 ( )B
B A
P
P P
ρ = +  as the probability of 
choosing B over A, we estimate the divergence between the densities of 21ρ  for treated and 
control units as:  
| 21 | 21
| 21 21 | 21 21
| 21 | 21
( ) ( )
ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ( )
( ) ( )
p T B p T A
p T B p T A
p T A p T B
f f
KL f d f d
f f
ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ
= =
= =
= =
= +∫ ∫    (5) 
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In (5), | 21( )p T Bf ρ=  is the density function of 21ρ  among schools treated with B, and 
| 21( )p T Af ρ=  is the analogous density function for schools that used curriculum A. A KL-
information-criterion measure of zero suggests that the densities are identical, and the measure 
increases with density divergence. Note that when the parameters of interest are average effects 
of treatment on the treated, researchers use a unidirectional version of the KL information 
criterion (see, for example, Frölich, 2004). In our case, where average treatment effects are the 
parameters of interest, we use the bidirectional information criterion originally suggested by 
Kullback and Leibler (1951). 
 Figure 1 plots the estimated density functions of the propensity scores for treatment and 
control schools for each pairwise comparison, and Table 3 reports the corresponding KL 
information criteria. Similarly to the balancing tests, the density-divergence measures suggest 
that the data conditions are most favorable in our comparison between B and A. Density 
divergence is largest in our comparison between C and A.21 
Both the balancing tests and the density-divergence measures indicate that our data are 
best-suited to compare curricula B and A, which combined, accounted for over 70 percent of the 
curriculum market in Indiana during the 1998 adoption cycle. In the other two comparisons the 
data conditions are generally less favorable; however, even in these comparisons, it is not clear 
that they are cause for concern. We consider the reliability of our results from each comparison 
in more detail when we present the falsification tests in Section IX. 
VIII. Estimates of Curricular Effectiveness in Math 
Rather than overwhelm the reader with estimates using the numerous matching 
algorithms available in the literature, we instead present estimates using kernel and local-linear-
regression (LLR) matching only (for details on these and other matching estimators, see, for 
                                                 
21 Frölich (2004) uses unidirectional density divergence measures to describe the data conditions in his evaluation of 
the performance of different matching estimators. Although the one-sided measures are not directly comparable to 
the two sided measures; roughly speaking, our comparison between B and A corresponds to Frolich’s most-favorable 
density design, our comparison between C and B his middle design, and our comparison between C and A his least 
favorable design. This is purely by coincidence. 
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example, Heckman et al., 1997, 1998; Mueser et al., 2007). Frölich’s (2004) analysis indicates 
that kernel matching in particular should perform well in our context.22 As for LLR matching, 
the evidence in the literature is mixed.23 Although our estimates using LLR matching are less 
precise than the kernel-matching estimates, they are generally very similar. We present results 
using the Epanechnikov kernel for both types of matching estimators. In unreported results 
available upon request we show that our results are robust to alternative estimators, including 
kernel and LLR matching estimators that use the Gaussian kernel, other matching estimators 
based on simple pair matching or radius matching using various radii, and regression-adjusted 
and weighting estimators.  
Table 4 presents results for all grade-3 cohorts who were ever exposed to the curricula of 
interest using fixed-bandwidth matching estimators where the bandwidths are obtained via 
conventional cross-validation.24 All of our matching estimators impose the common support 
condition. We also report OLS estimates where we regress test score outcomes on the covariates 
used in the propensity score model and indicator variables for curriculum adoptions, retaining 
our pairwise comparisons (that is, when we compare B to A, we drop all schools at districts that 
adopted C). The standard errors for the matching and OLS estimates are clustered at the district 
level and the matching-estimator standard errors are bootstrapped using 250 repetitions.25 We 
obtain the optimal numbers of bootstrap repetitions to use for our standard error calculations 
following Ham et al. (2006), who use a special case of Andrews and Buchinsky (2001).26   
                                                 
22 Frölich’s (2004) study also suggests that ridge matching should perform well, but the ridge parameter will lead to 
bias in the case of multiple covariates (Frölich uses a single-covariate setting). See Heckman et al. (1998) for details. 
23For instance, Fan (1993) indicates that local linear regression has better sampling properties than the standard 
kernel estimator, and Caliendo and Koepinig (2005) suggest LLR is particularly useful when controls are distributed 
asymmetrically around treated observations. Frölich (2004) notes that LLR matching will perform worse in regions 
of sparse data, which is consistent with the large standard errors that we estimate in some years using LLR matching 
in our comparisons with less density overlap.  
24 In some cases the cross-validation estimates of the loss function are fairly flat. In these cases, we combine “visual 
inspection” with cross-validation to choose the optimal bandwidth. See Appendix B for details.  
25 Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that bootstrapping methods cannot be used to obtain standard errors for nearest-
neighbor matching estimators, but their study does not apply to smoother estimators like those used here. 
26 For our estimators, the optimal number of bootstrap repetitions is consistently near 200. We use 250 repetitions to 
ensure that we meet or exceed the optimal repetition count in each year. 
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Each cohort is labeled in the tables according to the year of its spring test score (i.e., the 
1998-1999 cohort is labeled “1999”). Recall that the 1999, 2000, 2005, and 2006 cohorts were 
only partially exposed to the curricula, while the cohorts from 2001 through 2004 were exposed 
for all three years. All of the effects in the table are standardized using the distribution of school-
level test scores. For example, the estimate in Table 4 for ATEB,A in 2002 indicates that, among 
the sample of schools that chose B or A, the average effect of using B instead of A was 0.40 
standard deviations of the distribution of school-level math test scores. More typically, 
researchers report effects that are standardized based on the distribution of individual-level 
scores, but we do not have access to the distributions of individual-level scores over the entire 
course of the data panel (specifically, we do not have these distributions for the years prior to 
1999-2000). In Appendix Table A.2, for each year where we have access to the individual-level 
distribution of test scores (such that we could compute the standard deviation), we provide the 
scaling factors that convert the estimates in Table 4 into the more common metric. Roughly 
speaking, dividing the coefficients by three returns estimates in the metric of standard deviations 
of the individual-level distribution of scores. 
Focusing first on our largest comparison between B and A, and the estimates for the fully-
exposed cohorts (2001 – 2004), we find that curriculum B meaningfully outperformed 
curriculum A. Averaging the kernel-matching estimates across all four fully-exposed cohorts, 
and using the appropriate scaling factors in Appendix Table A.2, the effect of using curriculum B 
instead of A was approximately 0.12 standard deviations of the test. Our estimates are also 
consistent with C outperforming A. There we estimate an average effect of roughly 0.06 standard 
deviations of the student-level distribution of scores, although only two of the four estimates are 
statistically significant and the estimate from 2004 is particularly small. Our results also suggest, 
at least weakly, that B outperformed C, although inference from this comparison is limited 
because the estimates are imprecise.27   
                                                 
27 We also note that our inability to follow individual students over time implies some downward bias in our 
estimates to the extent that students switch curricula between grades one and three. For example, even among 
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The magnitudes of the estimated curriculum effects are economically meaningful, 
particularly when weighed against the marginal costs associated with choosing one curriculum 
over another. Fryer and Levitt (2006) show that between grades one and three, the black-white 
achievement gap grows at a rate of approximately 0.10 standard deviations per year.28 In our 
most-compelling curriculum comparison, we estimate that the effect of choosing curriculum B 
over curriculum A is roughly equivalent to one year’s worth of expansion of the black-white 
achievement gap. Given that the curricula are very similarly priced (the texts from A, B and C 
were, averaged over grades 1-3, $23.08, $24.80 and $25.34 each, respectively, in 1998 dollars), 
selecting a better curriculum appears to be a cost-effective way to improve student achievement.  
We do not find any evidence of curriculum-familiarity effects for the fully-exposed 
cohorts. If curriculum familiarity were important for teachers, we might expect the 2001 and 
2002 cohorts, for example, to be less affected by curriculum differences than the cohorts in 2003 
and 2004 (under the assumption that when familiarity is low, curriculum implementation by 
teachers reverts toward a common mean). There is no evidence of such a trend in curricular 
effectiveness across cohorts. 
Our results for the partially-exposed cohorts differ by comparison. One common theme is 
that the point estimates for the 2005 and 2006 cohorts are generally larger than for the 1999 and 
2000 cohorts. In fact, in our comparison between B and A, the estimates for the 2005 and 2006 
cohorts are large and statistically distinguishable from zero. Note that the 2005 and 2006 cohorts 
were exposed to the curricula as the treatments were winding down, while the earlier cohorts 
were exposed when the treatments were just beginning. If using the respective curricula for 
multiple years affects schools and teachers, regardless of student exposure, this may explain our 
findings for the 2005 and 2006 partially-exposed cohorts. Also of interest is that, per Section IV, 
curriculum B is distinguished from the other curricula in terms of mathematics pedagogy 
                                                                                                                                                             
students from the fully-exposed cohorts, across-district movers who are tested in grade-3 may only be partially 
exposed to their assigned curricula. 
28 Fryer and Levitt (2006) analyze a different testing instrument; however, similar estimates of the black-white 
achievement gap spread are available elsewhere (see, for example, Chubb and Loveless, 2002).  
23 
 
(specifically, curriculum B relies more on mathematical models). Although it would be entirely 
speculative to link the benefits of curriculum B to any specific attribute, this pedagogical 
difference would have the potential to stay with teachers and administrators beyond the 
curriculum adoption cycle of interest.29   
In terms of gaining further inference from the partially exposed cohorts, we face two 
obstacles. First, although we cannot distinguish any curriculum-familiarity using the fully-
exposed cohorts, there may be familiarity issues upon immediate adoption, which would affect 
the 1999 and 2000 cohorts but not the 2005 and 2006 cohorts. Second, the students in all of the 
partial-exposure cohorts were exposed to other curricula in other adoption cycles. This is likely 
to attenuate the partial-exposure estimates. The degree of attenuation will depend on the extent to 
which curricular quality is correlated across adoption cycles for treatment and control schools, 
which we explore to the extent possible in Table 5.   
Table 5 compares curriculum adoptions in the 2004 adoption cycle across uniform 
adopters from 1998 (recall that we do not have curriculum adoption data from the prior cycle in 
1992). For brevity, the table shows adoption shares in 2004 only for the four most popular 
curricula from that adoption cycle (published by Saxon, Harcourt, Houghton-Mifflin and Scott-
Foresman). For the 2005 and 2006 cohorts, Table 5 provides direct information about the 
curricula to which they were exposed after the 1998 adoption cycle. For the 1999 and 2000 
cohorts, it is merely suggestive about the extent to which curriculum adoptions in the prior cycle 
may have been correlated with the 1998 adoptions. The table shows that while Saxon adopters 
(curriculum A) in 1998 were much more likely to adopt Saxon in 2004, adopters of the other two 
curricula are quite dispersed across alternative options during the 2004 adoption cycle. Without 
knowing the respective qualities of the different curricula adopted outside of the 1998 adoption 
cycle, including those from the same publishers (there is no evidence that we are aware of on the 
                                                 
29 Equally interesting is that Mathematically Correct, which has a preference for non-model-based mathematics 
instruction, rated curriculum B similarly to A and C. Given Mathematically Correct’s pedagogical preference, it is 
almost certain that curriculum B was downgraded for using models, which suggests the quality of the curriculum 
outside of this issue may be high. 
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persistence of publisher quality), it is difficult to form expectations based on the patterns in Table 
5.30 Ultimately, given the potential for attenuation in the estimates for the partially exposed 
cohorts, and the sizes of our standard errors, we cannot make strong inference about partial-
exposure curriculum effects.  
Table 5 is also informative about the changing market shares of curriculum publishers 
over time. It shows that the publisher of curriculum A, despite its relative underperformance, 
maintained its near-50-percent market share from the 1998 adoption cycle to the 2004 adoption 
cycle. Although curriculum B was the most effective curriculum during the 1998 adoption cycle, 
it did not appear in 2004. The publisher of curriculum B was bought by Pearson Publishing 
during the 1998 cycle and Pearson phased out curriculum B in favor of curriculum C, which it 
also publishes. Curriculum C’s market share fell from roughly fifteen to nine percent across 
adoption cycles. 
Finally, in an omitted analysis we also considered the possibility that the treatment effects 
depend on treatment status. For example, despite our finding that curriculum B outperformed 
curriculum A on average, it could be that curriculum A was still better for schools that actually 
chose A, while curriculum B performed better for schools that chose B. To investigate the extent 
to which the curriculum effects might depend on treatment status, for each of our comparisons 
we estimated average treatment-on-the-treated effects (ATT) in each direction. Our findings 
provide few insights. In our comparison between B and A, the treatment effects do not depend on 
treatment status. Similarly, the ATT’s in our comparison between C and B do not suggest 
differential effects (although again, these estimates are noisy). Only in our comparison between 
C and A do we find any evidence of differential curriculum effects. There, curriculum A appears 
to perform less poorly relative to C at schools that actually chose A. Nonetheless, even our 
                                                 
30 Evidence on the persistence of publisher quality would be difficult to obtain without the availability of consistent 
comparisons over time. For example, because Silver-Burdett Ginn did not offer a curriculum in Indiana during the 
2004 adoption, our most reliable comparisons (per Section VII) cannot be replicated in the later adoption cycle. 
Even more, we cannot reliably compare Saxon and Scott-Foresman in 2004 because of the large decline in Scott-
Foresman’s market share across adoption cycles. Even in cases where curriculum publishers are consistently 
represented across adoption cycles, long cycle durations imply that long data panels will be required to evaluate the 
persistence of publisher quality. 
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estimates of ATTA,C suggest that schools that actually chose A would have been better off had 
they instead chosen C. 
Overall, our most reliable estimates of curricular effectiveness come from the four 
cohorts of fully-exposed students who used the curricula of interest in grades one, two and three. 
Our estimates based on these cohorts indicate that curriculum B outperformed curriculum A by a 
substantial margin. We also find that C outperformed A, although the differential effect was 
smaller. The statistical imprecision associated with our comparison between C and B limits 
inference, but if anything, our estimates suggest that B outperformed C. The relative 
underperformance of curriculum A did not adversely impact the publisher’s market share in the 
next adoption cycle in Indiana.  
IX. Falsification Tests 
Matching estimators will not return causal estimates if conditional independence is 
violated. Although conditional independence is not a testable assumption, we provide some 
evidence on its plausibility using a series of falsification tests. We present falsification tests 
based on data from students who were never actually exposed to the curricula of interest (e.g., 
cohorts of grade-3 and grade-6 students from the mid 1990s), and from students who were 
exposed, but we estimate curriculum effects on reading test scores. For the students who were 
never exposed to the curricula we expect to estimate “effects” that are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. For the reading estimates, timing does not rule out the possibility of 
causal effects for some cohorts; however, at most, we would expect only small across-subject 
spillover effects. 
Potentially confounding both types of falsification estimates are correlations in 
curriculum adoptions across grades, subjects, and adoption cycles. Recall from Table 5 that there 
are non-zero correlations in math-curriculum adoptions across adoption cycles. Not surprisingly, 
in unreported results (omitted for brevity and available upon request) we also find that math 
curriculum adoptions are correlated across grades within adoption cycles, and to a lesser extent, 
with curriculum adoptions in other subjects (where the adoptions overlap imperfectly with the 
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math adoptions – see Section II). The correlations between the curricula of interest and the other 
curricula to which the falsification cohorts were exposed could potentially confound the 
falsification tests. For example, if curriculum quality is correlated across adoption cycles for 
districts, the falsification estimates will capture more than just bias, making them difficult to 
interpret. However, in practice, the correlations in curricular quality across adoption cycles do 
not appear to be strong enough to limit inference from our falsification exercise - almost all of 
the falsification estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
For brevity, we only report falsification estimates using kernel matching with the 
Epanechnikov kernel.31 We present 80 falsification estimates in all (but note that the tests are not 
independent).32 Summarizing the results, the tests do not uncover any consistent evidence of 
selection bias in any of our comparisons, although similarly to Table 4, the falsification estimates 
are noisy in our comparison between C and B, limiting inference. 
We begin by estimating curriculum “effects” on math test scores for cohorts of grade-3 
students from 1992 through 1996, and 2007 and 2008 (recall that we use data from 1997 and 
1998 to match schools). The results are reported in Table 6. Our most-convincing falsification 
estimates are from the 1992-1996 cohorts, who passed through Indiana schools prior to the 
curriculum-adoption cycle we study. For these cohorts, all of the estimates are small and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero with the exception of the 1992 estimate in our 
comparison between C and A. Although the 2007 and 2008 cohorts were not actually exposed to 
the curricula of interest, their outcomes were observed after the curriculum-adoption cycle we 
study. This leaves open the possibility of non-zero treatment effects for these cohorts, limiting 
inference to some degree, but even so, none of the estimates from these cohorts are statistically 
significant.   
                                                 
31 In unreported results we verify that our findings are robust to using the Gaussian kernel instead of the 
Epanechnikov kernel and to alternative matching estimators. 
32 If the falsification tests were independent we would expect roughly eight “false positives” in total. However, 
treatment and control schools are uniformly defined over time, making it unclear how many false positives to 
expect.  
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Next we estimate curriculum “effects” using cohorts of grade-6 students who were never 
exposed to the curricula of interest (cohorts from 1993-2001). For these falsification tests we use 
the same matching procedure to predict the same treatments (the uniform adoption of curriculum 
A, B or C in grades one, two and three), only we match schools that have grade-6 classrooms and 
estimate the “effects” of the curricula on grade-6 achievement.  
Many districts teach grades three and six in different buildings (i.e., elementary and 
middle schools). Further, multiple elementary schools generally feed into a single middle school, 
meaning that the grade-6 samples of schools are much smaller than the grade-3 samples. This 
turns out to be problematic for our grade-6 comparisons involving curriculum C because our 
sample of curriculum-C districts is small. When we focus our attention on grade-6 schools, our 
sample of schools in curriculum-C districts falls to below 100 (roughly 80, on average, across the 
data panel), and we cannot balance treatment and control schools in either of our comparisons 
involving this curriculum. For example, taking the average p-values from the Smith and Todd 
(2005) balancing regressions across years for the comparisons involving curriculum C, they fall 
from roughly 0.50 in the grade-3 analysis (as reported in Table 2), to roughly 0.20 in the grade-6 
analysis. Alternatively, in our grade-6 comparison between B and A the sample sizes are much 
larger, and the balance in the grade-6 comparison is only slightly worse than in the grade-3 
comparison (the average p-value across years falls to just below 0.50 in the grade-6 sample).33 
The lack of balance in the grade-6 comparisons involving curriculum C suggests that 
estimates from these comparisons will not be informative. Therefore, we present grade-6 
falsification estimates only for our comparison between B and A. These estimates are reported in 
                                                 
33 That the grade-6 comparisons involving curriculum C are unbalanced while the grade-3 comparisons appear to be 
roughly balanced is interesting but perhaps not surprising given the small samples of schools that are available for 
the grade-6 analysis. We can only speculate as to why the grade-6 schools are less balanced in the data. Our small 
samples are surely partly responsible, but how students matriculate through schooling levels at different districts, 
and how students are dispersed across sets of elementary schools that feed into a single middle school, may also be 
important.  One easily observable difference between districts that adopted curriculum C and the other districts is 
that the ratio of grade-6 to grade-3 schools is smallest for curriculum-C districts. This is likely because curriculum-C 
districts tend to be larger (see Table 1). Ultimately, the grade-6 data in our comparisons involving curriculum C are 
not well-suited for a matching analysis. 
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Table 7, where we estimate one non-zero “effect” in 1993, but otherwise, the point estimates are 
generally small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
In Table 8 we return to our well-balanced grade-3 samples and estimate math curriculum 
effects on reading test scores for all cohorts in the data panel. Students in the cohorts from 1992 
through 1996, and 2007 and 2008, were never exposed to the curricula of interest. The other 
cohorts of students were exposed, and it is unclear a priori whether we should expect any across-
subject spillover effects. We suggest four possible mechanisms that may generate spillover 
effects. First, math curricula may directly affect reading performance. As an example, math 
curricula may differentially use word problems, which could lead to differential effects on 
reading scores. Second, the training for teachers associated with each math curriculum could 
affect teacher performance in other subjects. Third, a better math curriculum may afford teachers 
more time to spend on reading instruction. Fourth, a better math curriculum may increase the 
return to math instruction and encourage teachers to substitute out of reading instruction and into 
math instruction. These latter two possibilities are analogous to income and substitution effects 
from basic microeconomic theory. The direction of the across-subject spillover will depend on 
which effect dominates. 
 Although we do not have a strong prior about whether math curricula affect reading 
outcomes, one straightforward expectation is that the effects of math curricula on math test 
scores should be larger in magnitude than their effects on reading test scores. Thus, at its most 
basic level, this final test should confirm this result. Table 8 presents estimates for the effects of 
the math curricula on reading test scores throughout our data panel, and indeed, the point 
estimates are generally small and there is only one statistically significant estimate (in our 
comparison between B and A in 2002). 
While all of the estimates in Table 8 are relatively small, and only one is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, taking the point estimates at face value at least raises the possibility 
that our primary findings are biased, particularly in our comparisons between B and A, and C and 
29 
 
B.34 Therefore, we briefly consider how a pure-bias interpretation of the reading estimates would 
impact our results by assuming that across-subject spillover effects are zero. To do this, we 
estimate math-curriculum effects on schools’ de-trended math test scores, where we de-trend 
each school’s math score by separately standardizing its math and reading test scores, and 
subtracting the reading score from the math score. We omit the estimates for brevity, but note 
that they are in line with what would be expected by subtracting the stand-alone reading 
estimates from the stand-alone math estimates. Specifically, the estimates still indicate that B 
outperforms A, although the point estimates fall by roughly half, and that C outperforms A. The 
estimates that are statistically significant in Table 4 for these comparisons remain statistically 
significant in the de-trended analysis. In the comparison between C and B, the curricula are not 
statistically distinguishable in any year using the de-trended estimates. We treat the de-trended 
results as lower bounds because they assume that across-subject spillover effects are zero.35  
X. Persistence 
Finally, we use our extended data panel to evaluate the persistence of curriculum effects 
over time. Specifically, in our comparison between B and A, we ask whether the cohorts of 
students who were exposed to curriculum B in grades one, two and three still performed better by 
grade six.36 We measure persistence using test score outcomes for cohorts of grade-6 students 
between 2002 and 2008. These cohorts correspond to the cohorts of grade-3 students who were 
exposed to the curricula of interest in our primary analysis – for example, the 2005 cohort of 
grade-6 students is also the 2002 cohort of grade-3 students. The fully exposed cohorts were in 
grade six between 2004 and 2007.  
                                                 
34 One seemingly obvious source of bias is that we do not condition on reading curriculum adoptions in producing 
our estimates. However, math and reading curriculum adoptions are not highly correlated, and in an omitted analysis 
we show that this cannot account for our findings in Table 8.  
35 We compute effect sizes for our comparisons between B and A, and C and A, as in the previous section by 
averaging the de-trended estimates across the four fully-exposed cohorts. This suggests an effect size of choosing B 
over A of approximately 0.07 standard deviations of the test. The effect of choosing C over A remains the same, 0.06 
standard deviations, by virtue of the small reading estimates. 
36 As discussed in the previous section, we are unable to construct observationally equivalent comparisons of treated 
and control schools from the grade-6 sample in our evaluations involving curriculum C.  Therefore, we only 
examine persistence in our comparison between B and A. 
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Two issues merit attention in our persistence analysis. First, if there are test-score ceilings 
in higher grades on the Indiana test, it will be difficult to detect persistence effects because the 
tests in later grades may not adequately differentiate student learning. We test for ceiling effects 
following Koedel and Betts (2010) and find that the testing instruments should be sufficient to 
detect any persistence effects should such effects exist. A second concern is that we cannot track 
individual students over time in the data, and as a consequence our assignments to curriculum 
treatments during grades 1-3 may not be accurate for all students in any given cohort. That is, 
while every school that contains a grade-6 classroom is attached to a district, allowing us to 
identify the curriculum to which students would have been exposed in grades 1-3 if they attended 
a school in that same district, some students may have moved districts between grades 1-6. This 
churning implies that some of the students who contribute to a school’s grade-6 test score were 
not actually treated with the district’s curriculum in the early grades. This will add noise to our 
treatment classifications, attenuating any estimated persistence effects.37  
Table 9 presents our persistence findings, again using kernel matching with the 
Epanechnikov kernel. Even though we expect our results to be attenuated to some extent per the 
previous discussion, the estimates in the table provide little indication that curriculum effects 
persist over time. Put differently, for the estimates in the table to be driven by downward bias 
from student movement across districts, the amount of student movement would need to be 
inordinately large. This result is consistent with a large body of evidence pointing to a general 
lack of persistence in the effects of educational inputs (see, for example, Jacob et al., 2008; U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2010), and raises doubts about the extent to which 
administrators can improve student performance in the long run by choosing more effective 
curricula.  
 
 
                                                 
37 As noted above, student churning across districts is also a problem in our primary analysis, although less so. For 
example, if a student changes districts in grade-2, she may change curricula. Therefore, all of our estimates will be 
biased toward zero to some extent.  
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XI. Conclusion 
We identify causal curriculum effects using non-experimental data from the state of 
Indiana. A key component of our study is our falsification exercise, where we use data from 
multiple cohorts of students who were never exposed to the curricula of interest, and students’ 
out-of-subject test scores, to show that our findings are unlikely to be driven by selection into the 
different curricula. In cases where data conditions are favorable, and some form of confirmation 
exercise is possible (like our falsification tests), much can be learned from careful, non-
experimental work. A caveat relating to curricular evaluation is that, somewhat surprisingly, 
most states do not centrally track curriculum adoptions. Given that it would be relatively 
inexpensive to track this information, and that curricula play such a large role in students’ 
everyday learning experiences, this seems peculiar.  
Currently, the bulk of the curricular-effectiveness debate is not based on rigorous 
evidence from analyses of implementation. For example, in addition to the general lack of rigor 
in comparative curricular evaluations (WWC, 2007), much of the literature relies on case studies, 
or content studies, where curriculum impacts on student outcomes are not measured (National 
Research Board, 2004). Rigorous scientific evidence about how different curricula actually affect 
student achievement is needed in order for administrators and educators to make informed 
decisions. Our study provides such evidence on a scale not yet seen in the curriculum-evaluation 
literature. 
That our study is non-experimental allows us to bypass some of the limitations inherent 
to experimental analyses of curricular effectiveness. These limitations include the 
experimentation on a subpopulation problem (Manski, 1996), and the possibility of publisher 
Hawthorne effects. The latter concern seems particularly important given publishers’ active roles 
in curriculum experiments. Another benefit of our non-experimental approach is that it is feasible 
to replicate in other environments both methodologically and fiscally. In contrast to the ongoing 
project by Agodini et al. (2009), a particularly well-designed RCT that is funded by the Institute 
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for Education Sciences for roughly 21 million dollars over five years, our study was performed 
using publicly available data at only a small fraction of this cost. 
We also note several limitations of our study. For one, we do not have enough data, or the 
right kind of data (i.e., student level), to evaluate the extent to which curricula differentially 
affect different types of students (e.g., high and low-achieving, English-proficient and ESL, etc.). 
This deficiency in our analysis is likely to be less problematic in the future because districts and 
states continue to develop longitudinal databases that track individual students. These data could 
be linked to curriculum data, if such data were available, quite easily. We also depend on the 
standardized test administered by the state of Indiana as our outcome measure (the ISTEP). 
While we expect our results to extrapolate well to other states or districts that use similar tests, 
they may not carry over to states or districts where the testing instrument differs greatly in 
content. Our results also may not extrapolate well to states or regions where the student 
population differs greatly from the student population in Indiana, which is a fairly rural state.  
Our findings indicate that students in Indiana who used curricula B or C outperformed 
students who used curriculum A. In our most compelling comparison, between B and A, the 
effect of exposure to the better curriculum for three consecutive years is roughly 0.12 standard 
deviations of the grade-3 ISTEP test. This effect is similar in magnitude to one year’s growth of 
the black-white achievement gap over these grades (Fryer and Levitt, 2006). Interestingly, 
despite the consistent underperformance of curriculum A in our analysis, the publisher of 
curriculum A did not lose market share in the next curriculum adoption cycle in Indiana. There 
are many possible explanations for this finding, ranging from a lack of reliable information 
available to administrators about curricular quality (WWC, 2007), to poor decision making by 
educational administrators (also see Ballou, 1996). 
Overall, our results are encouraging because choosing a better curriculum can non-
negligibly improve student performance. Further, the near-zero marginal cost of choosing one 
curriculum over another suggests that implementing a better curriculum will be quite cost-
effective. However, our finding that curriculum effects do not persist over time, although not 
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unique to curriculum in education, dampens enthusiasm about the potential benefits of improved 
curricula. By grade six, the benefits of the most-effective curriculum in our study are no longer 
distinguishable. 
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Figure 1. Probability Density Functions for Estimated Propensity Scores for Treatment and Control Units on the Common Support in 
Each Comparison Using 2001 Data (Solid Lines are Treatment Densities, Dashed Lines are Control Densities). 
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Table 1. Average Characteristics of Schools and Districts, by Adopted Curriculum (1997 values) 
 Sample 
Average 
Saxon (A) Silver (B) Scott (C) 
School-Level Outcomes     
Attendance Rate  96.2 96.3a 96.1a 96.3 
Grade-3 Math Test Score 496.6 496.5 494.2c 499.7c 
Grade-3 Language Test Score 496.7 496.1 495.8 498.7 
     
School-Level Characteristics     
Percent Free Lunch 27.4 24.7a,b 28.5a 30.5b 
Percent Reduced Lunch 6.7 7.1a 6.3a 6.6 
Percent Not Fluent in English 1.2 0.7a 1.7a 1.2 
Percent Language Minority 2.6 1.8a 3.9a 2.6 
Percent White 91.3 95.4a,b 88.0a 88.4b 
Percent Black 5.6 2.3a,b 7.2a,c 9.2b,c 
Percent Asian 0.7 0.4a,b 0.9a 1.1b 
Percent Hispanic 2.2 1.8a,b 3.7a,c 1.1b,c 
Percent American Indian 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Enrollment (logs) 5.95 5.92 5.97 5.96 
N (Schools) 716 311 221 184 
     
District-Level Outcomes     
Attendance Rate  95.8 95.7b 95.8 96.1b 
Grade-3 Math Test Score 498.1 495.8b 498.1a,c 506.9b 
Grade-3 Language Test Score 498.9 496.5a,b 500.6a 505.6b 
     
District-Level Characteristics     
Enrollment (logs) 7.72 7.60a,b 7.8a,c 8.2b,c 
Total Per-Pupil Revenue (logs) 8.83 8.81b 8.84 8.87b 
Local Per-Pupil Revenue (logs) 7.24 7.18b 7.24c 7.47b,c 
     
Census Information (District Level)     
Median Household Income (logs) 10.81 10.8a,b 10.8a,c 10.9b,c 
Share of Population with Low Education 18.2 18.8b 19.2c 14.3b,c 
N (Districts) 213 124 56 33 
a Indicates statistically significant difference at the 10% level between Saxon and Silver-Burdett Ginn adopters. 
b Indicates statistically significant difference at the 10% level between Saxon and Scott-Foresman adopters. 
c Indicates statistically significant difference at the 10% level between Silver-Burdett Ginn and Scott-Foresman 
adopters. 
Note: The propensity-score specification also uses italicized information from 1998 – differences in means for these 
years are not reported for brevity. 
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Table 2. Balancing details for the 32 covariates included in the multinomial probit specification. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Silver (B) to Saxon (A)                
# of unbalanced covariates  
(p-values below 0.05/0.10) 
1/4 0/4 0/3 0/2 0/2 0/2 0/0 0/0 0/2 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/2 1/2 1/3 
                
Average p-value from 
balancing tests, all covariates 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.53 
                
Mean Standardized Bias 3.4 2.9 3.8 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.0 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.7 
                
Scott (C) to Saxon (A)                
# of unbalanced covariates  
(p-values below 0.05/0.10) 
2/4 4/6 3/6 4/6 3/5 3/6 3/5 3/5 3/6 5/5 3/5 4/5 5/5 5/5 3/4 
                
Average p-value from 
balancing tests, all covariates 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46 
                
Mean Standardized Bias 8.5 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.6 6.3 6.0 7.2 7.6 7.4 7.6 7.6 8.2 
                
Scott (C) to Silver (B)                
# of unbalanced covariates  
(p-values below 0.05/0.10) 
2/5 2/5 2/5 2/5 1/3 0/4 0/4 1/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 0/4 1/4 3/5 2/4 
                
Average p-value from 
balancing tests, all covariates 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.54 
                
Mean Standardized Bias 9.6 10.2 8.8 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.5 9.7 9.8 10.1 10.6 10.6 10.8 10.6 10.8 
Note: Columns in italics are for years that are contiguous to the years from which the matching criteria are drawn. Results reported using the samples of 
treatments and controls that are on the common support in each year for the kernel-matching estimators. The numbers of covariates that fail the balancing tests at 
the 5 percent level are a subset of those that fail at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table 3. Kullback-Leibler (KL) Information Criteria by Curriculum Comparison. 
Comparison KL Information Criterion 
B and A 0.63 
C and A 1.58 
C and B 0.91 
Note:  Based on 2001 sample of schools. 
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Table 4. Estimates of Math Curricular Effectiveness on Math Test Scores for Partially and Fully-
Exposed Cohorts. All Comparisons. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Treatment: B   Control: A 
 
OLS 0.124 
(0.105) 
0.162 
(0.101) 
0.354 
(0.095)** 
0.356 
(0.087)** 
0.374 
(0.099)** 
0.268 
(0.131)* 
0.293 
(0.104)** 
0.250 
(0.110)* 
         
Kernel Matching 0.144    
(0.139)  
0.191    
(0.145)  
0.396    
(0.125)** 
0.400    
(0.102)** 
0.401  
(0 .116)**   
0.279    
(0.135)* 
0.318    
(0.130)** 
0.253   
(0.132)† 
         
LLR Matching 0.154    
(0.184)  
0.173   
(0.153)  
0.397    
(0.117)** 
0.398   
(0.122)** 
0.398     
(0.126)** 
0.273    
(0.147)†   
0.308    
(0.138)*   
0.259   
(0.134)†  
 
Treatment: C   Control: A 
OLS 0.130 
(0.120) 
-0.013 
(0.134) 
0.187 
(0.104)† 
0.261 
(0.096)** 
0.208 
(0.110)† 
0.014 
(0.119) 
0.109 
(0.104) 
0.183 
(0.119) 
         
Kernel Matching 0.117    
(0.169) 
0.010    
(0.184) 
0.215   
(0.158)   
0.270    
(0.122)*  
0.272    
(0.124)* 
-0.042    
(0.118)   
0.113    
(0.187)   
0.150    
(0.187)   
         
LLR Matching 0.128  
(0.248) 
0.135   
(0.269) 
0.169    
(0.220)    
 0.295   
(0.156)†  
0.301  
(0.199)   
 0.032    
(0.224) 
0.085   
(0.243)    
0.141     
(0.354)   
         
         
Treatment: C   Control: B 
OLS 0.008 
(0.100) 
-0.160 
(0.123) 
-0.100 
(0.117) 
-0.186 
(0.129) 
-0.285 
(0.166)† 
-0.271 
(0.162)† 
-0.181 
(0.129) 
-0.083 
(0.139) 
         
Kernel Matching -0.088   
(0.255)  
-0.237   
(0.274)  
-0.165    
(0.230) 
-0.164    
(0.183)  
-0.331    
(0.193)†  
-0.275  
(0.204)  
-0.208   
(0.239)  
-0.148   
(0.249)  
         
LLR Matching -0.072    
(0.657)  
-0.230   
(0.531)  
-0.149  
(0.652)  
-0.122    
(0.898) 
-0.302    
(0.358)  
  -0.236    
(0.219)  
-0.163    
(0.484)  
-0.163    
(0.798)   
         
N(A) 309 307 307 305 300 294 286 287 
N(B) 220 219 219 213 213 212 210 207 
N(C) 184 182 182 181 176 174 169 163 
Notes: Bolded columns are for the fully-exposed cohorts. Matching estimators impose the common support 
restriction. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level for all estimates, and bootstrapped using 
250 repetitions for the matching estimators. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better 
*   Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better 
†   Denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better 
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Table 5. Average 2004 Curriculum Adoptions in Math by District for the Four Most Common 
Curricula from the 2004 Adoption Cycle.  
  1998 Uniform Math Adoptions – Grades 1 Through 3  
 All Saxon (A) Silver-Burdett 
Ginn (B) 
Scott-Foresman 
(C) 
Other 
2004 Math Adoptions      
Grade 1      
Saxon 0.48 0.76 0.25 0.12 0.21
Harcourt 0.19 0.07 0.32 0.35 0.24
Houghton Mifflin 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.15
Scott-Foresman 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.18
Grade 2      
Saxon 0.48 0.77 0.25 0.09 0.24
Harcourt 0.19 0.08 0.32 0.35 0.21
Houghton Mifflin 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.15
Scott-Foresman 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.18 0.18
Grade 3      
Saxon 0.48 0.76 0.23 0.09 0.24
Harcourt 0.18 0.08 0.32 0.35 0.21
Houghton Mifflin 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.15
Scott-Foresman 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.21 0.15
Grade 4      
Saxon 0.47 0.73 0.21 0.12 0.24
Harcourt 0.18 0.09 0.30 0.35 0.21
Houghton Mifflin 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.15
Scott-Foresman 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.15
Grade 5      
Saxon 0.47 0.74 0.21 0.18 0.22
Harcourt 0.18 0.08 0.30 0.32 0.22
Houghton Mifflin 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.16
Scott-Foresman 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.16
      
N 286 128 57 34 33
Notes: N indicates the number districts where we observe a 2004 math curriculum adoption and at least one grade-3 
math test score between 1998 and 2008. The “other” category includes all districts that did not adopt any of the “big 
three” curricula in any grade during the 1998 adoption cycle. Districts that adopted at least one of the big-three 
curricula non-uniformly during the 1998 adoption cycle are included only in the “all” category.  
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Table 6. Falsification Estimates of Math Curricular Effectiveness, Estimated Using Math Test 
Scores for Grade-3 Cohorts Who Were Never Exposed to the Curricula of Interest. All 
Comparisons. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  2007 2008
 
Treatment: B   Control: A 
Kernel Matching   -0.120   
(0.112)  
0.072    
(0.135)  
-0.019    
(0.120) 
0.079   
(0.137) 
0.094    
 (0.129)  
 0.091    
(0.117)  
0.192    
(0.127)  
 
Treatment: C   Control: A 
Kernel Matching -0.326   
(0.162)*  
-0.046   
(0.174)  
-0.011    
(0.146)  
-0.035    
(0.186)  
-0.045     
(0.153)  
 -0.020    
(0.157)     
-0.050    
(0.270)  
 
Treatment: C   Control: B 
Kernel Matching -0.171     
(0.274)  
0.077   
(0.277)  
0.032    
(0.237)  
0.072    
(0.294)   
-0.066   
(0.280) 
 -0.147    
(0.202)  
-0.235    
(0.263)   
         
N(A) 301 304 304 306 308  284 280 
N(B) 209 210 213 216 220  205 201 
N(C) 179 179 182 182 182  163 162 
Notes: Matching estimators impose the common support restriction. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the district level and bootstrapped using 250 repetitions. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better 
*   Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better 
†   Denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better 
 
 
 
Table 7. Falsification Estimates of Math Curricular Effectiveness, Estimated Using Math Test 
Scores for Grade-6 Cohorts who were Never Exposed to the Curricula of Interest. Comparison of 
B and A only. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1999 2000 2001
 
Treatment: B   Control: A 
Kernel Matching -0.126 
(0.155) 
-0.290 
(0.165)† 
-0.055 
(0.158) 
-0.133 
(0.139) 
0.045 
(0.142) 
 0.016 
(0.177) 
-0.190 
(0.151) 
-0.100 
(0.130) 
          
N(A) 205 208 213 213 218  212 205 204 
N(B) 117 118 122 125 127  122 120 120 
Notes: Matching estimators impose the common support restriction. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the district level and bootstrapped using 250 repetitions.  
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better 
*   Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better 
†   Denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better 
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Table 8. Estimates of Math Curricular Effectiveness, Estimated Using Reading Test Scores for all Grade-3 Cohorts. All Comparisons. 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Treatment: B   Control: A 
Kernel Matching -0.152 
(0.110) 
 
-0.036 
(0.131) 
-0.078 
(0.130) 
0.082 
(0.129) 
0.135 
(0.141) 
0.160 
(0.141) 
0.186 
(0.146) 
0.197 
(0.146) 
0.228 
(0.123)† 
0.150 
(0.120) 
 
0.084 
(0.127) 
0.027 
(0.148) 
0.044 
(0.122) 
-0.084 
(0.118) 
0.069 
(0.117) 
Treatment: C   Control: A 
Kernel Matching 
 
-0.200 
(0.156) 
-0.126 
(0.175) 
-0.107 
(0.178) 
-0.154 
(0.206) 
-0.161 
(0.178) 
0.023 
(0.207) 
0.048 
(0.237) 
0.036 
(0.221) 
-0.043 
(0.159) 
0.037 
(0.177) 
-0.030 
(0.205) 
-0.080 
(0.205) 
0.184 
(0.208) 
0.028 
(0.205) 
0.084 
(0.212) 
Treatment: C   Control: B 
Kernel Matching -0.023 
(0.294) 
0.149 
(0.305) 
0.118 
(0.268) 
0.009 
(0.288) 
-0.179 
(0.290) 
-0.172 
(0.281) 
-0.143 
(0.321) 
-0.166 
(0.289) 
-0.222 
(0.245) 
-0.125 
(0.259) 
-0.095 
(0.213) 
-0.020 
(0.297) 
0.113 
(0.297) 
0.065 
(0.262) 
-0.014 
(0.303) 
 
                
N(A) 301 304 304 306 308 309 307 307 305 300 294 286 287 284 280 
N(B) 209 210 213 216 220 220 219 219 213 213 212 210 207 205 201 
N(C) 179 179 182 182 182 184 182 182 181 176 174 169 163 163 162 
Notes: Bolded columns are for the fully-exposed cohorts. Matching estimators impose the common support restriction. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the district level and bootstrapped using 250 repetitions. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better 
*   Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better 
†   Denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better 
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Table 9. Persistence Effects. Estimated Curriculum Effects for Grade-6 Cohorts who were 
Partially or Fully Exposed. Comparison of B and A only. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Treatment: B   Control: A 
Kernel Matching -0.064 
(0.151) 
0.141 
(0.146) 
0.156 
(0.199) 
0.077 
(0.173) 
0.007 
(0.150) 
-0.023 
(0.169) 
-0.016 
(0.159) 
        
N(A) 200 189 174 165 163 160 156 
N(B) 118 115 105 101 97 94 93 
Notes: Bolded columns are for the fully-exposed cohorts. Matching estimators impose the common support 
restriction. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level and bootstrapped using 250 repetitions. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level or better 
*   Denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better 
†   Denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better 
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Appendix A 
Supplementary Tables 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A.1. Data Sample Details. 
 Schools % of Universe  Districts % of Universe 
 
Universe*  1115   294  
      
Missing Information:      
District-reported curriculum adoption 3 0.3  3 1.0 
District outcome variables (1997) 2 0.2  2 0.7 
School outcome variables (1997) 23 2.2  1 0.3 
District finance or enrollment data (1997, 1998) 2 0.2  1 0.3 
School enrollment or demographic data (1997, 1998) 82 7.3  12 4.0 
      
Did not use one of the primary curricula in grades one, two or three 211 18.9  38 12.9 
Used only primary curricula, but did not uniformly adopt 76 6.8  24 8.2 
      
Final Sample 716 64.2  213 72.4 
* The universe consist of those schools and districts for which any information was reported in 1997, and at least one grade-3 math 
test score was reported for an exposed cohort (1999-2006). 
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Appendix Table A.2. Scaling Factors Used to Convert Estimation Metric from School-Level 
Distribution to Individual-Level Distribution for Grade-3 Math Scores. 
 
 
Year 
Standard Deviation 
of Distribution of 
School Scores 
Standard Deviation of 
Distribution of 
Individual Scores 
Approximate 
Scaling Factor 
1992 2.8 N/A N/A 
1993 2.9 N/A N/A 
1994 2.8 N/A N/A 
1995 2.8 N/A N/A 
1996 1.9 N/A N/A 
1999 21.3 N/A N/A 
2000 20.5 61.0 0.34 
2001 21.0 61.4 0.34 
2002 19.9 59.7 0.33 
2003 20.7 60.9 0.34 
2004 22.5 63.1 0.36 
2005 21.0 62.2 0.34 
2006 20.0 64.3 0.31 
2007 21.3 65.4 0.33 
2008 22.5 63.7 0.35 
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Appendix B 
Bandwidth Selection 
 
We use standard leave-one-out cross validation (C-V) to obtain fixed bandwidths for the kernel 
and LLR matching estimators. The grid search for kernel and LLR matching is over the range 
(0.005, 2.0). Using Frölich’s (2004) notation, the C-V approach selects the optimal bandwidth, 
hCV, by solving the following minimization problem for control observations:38 
 
2
1
ˆarg min( ) ( ( ))
Q
CV q q q
q
h h Y m p−
=
= −∑  
 
where q indexes the sample of control units, Y is the outcome (test score) and ˆ ( )q qm p− is the 
estimate of the mean outcome among the control observations, excluding observation q, 
conditional on the estimated propensity score for unit q.  
 
As has been reported in other contexts (see, for example, Ludwig and Miller, 2007), the loss 
function used to select the bandwidth is fairly flat in most of our comparisons. Therefore, we use 
a combination of conventional C-V and “visual inspection” to identify the appropriate bandwidth 
for each of our matching estimators.  
 
First, Figure B.1 illustrates a case where cross-validation produces a clear bandwidth choice at 
the global minimum of the loss function, for our comparison between B and A in 2000 using the 
kernel matching estimator. In this case we use bandwidth at the global minimum, 0.048. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 In our case the definition of “treatment” and “control” in arbitrary and therefore, we could use either group.  We 
use the largest group in each comparison. 
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Next, Figure B.2 illustrates a case where cross-validation suggests an optimal bandwidth at the 
edge of our grid search, for our comparison between B and A in 2005 using the kernel matching 
estimator. For this comparison we use a bandwidth of 0.062, which occurs just prior to the 
narrowly upward sloping portion of the curve. 
 
 
 
We describe our bandwidth selection procedure for the comparison in Figure B.2 as a 
combination of cross-validation and visual inspection. Because the flat region of the curve has a 
mild negative slope, the mechanical application of the C-V procedure would produce a 
bandwidth at the edge of our grid search, 2.0. However, by visual inspection, we can see that 
there is very little difference in the loss function between the bandwidth determined 
mechanically by the C-V procedure and a much narrower bandwidth selected after the initial 
drop in the loss function. We ultimately use the narrower bandwidth in this and similar cases 
because the efficiency gains associated with the wider bandwidth will be minimal, and the 
narrower bandwidth should reduce bias in the estimates. 
 
Across our grade-3 comparisons spanning the entire data panel, our approach of combining C-V 
with visual inspection yields a bandwidth at the global minimum of the loss function 40 percent 
of the time. In the remaining cases where the global minimum occurs at the edge of our grid 
search, the average increase in the loss function that we observe by choosing an interior 
bandwidth is 1.3 percent, with a maximum increase of 2.9 percent in one instance. Details about 
our bandwidth selection process for each estimator in the paper are available upon request.  
 
Finally, that cross validation produces large flat regions in the loss function in most of our 
comparisons provides some indirect evidence that curriculum adoptions are not meaningfully 
correlated with other, unobservable determinants of school performance. The flat regions suggest 
that as increasingly non-comparable units (as measured by the propensity score) are used as 
comparisons for one another, there is minimal change in their measured outcomes. Such 
conditions will certainly be favorable to a non-experimental analysis.  
